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IN THELEGAL
ORDER:
INEQUALITY
ANDCOMMENTARY
SOMEFURTHER
ANALYSIS
WILLIAM
C. BAILEY

Cleveland State University

I challenge DavidJacobs' supportfor the conflictmodelof the legal order,finding
serious limitationsin his cross-sectional test of the model.To avoidthese limitations
andto extendthe scope of Jacobs' study,I(1)applyhis modelto fouradditionalcrimes
againstpersonsandproperty;(2)examinerace as an additionaldimensionof social ineratios,a facquality;and(3)considerhow levelsof crimemightinfluenceimprisonment
torJacobs ignored.Ifindno supportfor the hypothesisthat race is a significantdeterminantof state imprisonmentpractices. Nordo I findincome inequalitya significant
for crimes against persons and property,except inthe case of
factorin imprisonment
larceny.
In "Inequality and the legal order: An ecological test of the conflict model," David Jacobs
(1978) hypothesizes that "the more there are differences in economic resources and economic
power, the more one can expect that the criminal codes will be administered in a way that pleases
monied elites." Specifically, violators of property crimes are more likely to be punished where
economic power and resources are distributed unequally. Jacobs emphasizes the importance of
economic inequality because "as long as money almost automatically confers power in western
society . . its unequal distribution ought to lead to outcomes preferred by the rich." He also emphasizes the punishment of property crimes because "one major guarantee of the supremacy of
an economic elite is property," and it stands to reason that the authorities will "make greater efforts to insure that violators of the property codes are sanctioned" (1978:516).
Jacobs examined the relationship between income inequality and state imprisonment ratios for
burglary and larceny using cross-sectional data for 1960. He introduced four other variables into
the analysis to control for spuriousness of the relationship between income inequality and certainty of imprisonment: (1) the percentage of residents living in large cities; (2) percent change in the
population from 1950 to 1960; (3) police per capita; and (4) resource level-mean income. His
analysis of 47 states revealed a significant positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios for both burglary and larceny, with income inequality being the best predictor
of imprisonment. When only non-southern states were considered (n = 35), however, this pattern was altered somewhat for burglary. Jacobs argues that the non-significant findings for
burglary for these states are not inconsistent with the conflict hypothesis, since "victimization
data indicate that groups with less money are the most frequent victims of this crime in nonsouthern areas" (1978:521, author's emphasis). That is, "differences in economic advantage and
power only predict imprisonment ratios for a crime of which a disproportionate number of victims are affluent" (1978:522).
THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION
While Jacobs should be commended for bringing a different research method to this subject,
his investigation suffers from a number of limitations:'
1) Can the relationship Jacobs finds between income inequality and imprisonment ratios for
larceny and burglary be generalized to other offenses? Jacobs argues that "because survey
evidence invariably indicates that the poor are much more likely to be victims of crimes of
1. Becausemy critiqueof Jacobs'studyis primarilymethodologicalin nature,the readeris referredto his article for a briefexaminationof the conflictperspectiveof the legalorderandthe theoreticalbasisof our two
investigations.

violence, the association between inequality and the imprisonment ratios for these crimes should
be noticeably weaker" (1978:516). He fails, however, to test this assertion by considering violent
crimes. To address this question, I applied Jacobs' model to (1) two violent crimes, murder and
assault; (2) one additional property crime, auto theft; and (3) robbery, which may be considered
either a property or a violent crime.
2) Jacobs used the Gini coefficient of income inequality as a measure of economic inequality,
but he did not simultaneously consider race as an additional dimension of inequality. He indicates that he considered race in his model, but that "variables like percent non-white are too
collinear with the index of inequality to be used in the same equation (r = .78)." In addition,
Jacobs reports that, when he substituted percent non-white population for the inequality
variable, "the index of inequality does better when independent variables are ranked according to
the strength of their coefficients." Thus, he concludes, "the racial aspect of inequality is not a
very important determinant of the imprisonment ratios" (1978:520). While this may be correct,
Jacobs' conclusion about the relative importance of race and income inequality on imprisonment
cannot be drawn from his analysis. The correlation of r = .78 (r2 = .61) does not provide sufficient evidence that income inequality and non-white population cannot both be entered into the
same equation due to collinearity. On the contrary, a sizable proportion of the variation - nearly
40 percent -in either of these variables cannot be accounted for by the other. In addition,
because Jacobs did not simultaneously consider both income inequality and race in his analysis,
his findings cannot support the claim that income inequality is a more important determinant of
imprisonment. To remedy this situation, I consider both variables simultaneously.
3) Jacobs recognizes that four other factors may influence variations in imprisonment ratios:
(1) It may be more difficult to apprehend offenders in large cities where social control is more difficult. (2) Imprisonments may be higher where there is a higher proportion of law enforcement
officers. (3) More resources may be applied to crime control where there is a larger tax base. (4)
Social control is likely to be more difficult where immigration has been high. To these four
variables I would add a fifth consideration that has received some attention in the recent general
deterrence literature-the influence of crime rates on the certainty of legal sanctions, including
imprisonment (Ehrlich, 1973, 1975; Fisher and Nagin, 1978; Logan, 1972, 1975; Nagin, 1978).
Not only may the certainty of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment influence crime rates (deterrence), but the level of crime may also influence the level of arrests, convictions, and imprisonments due to "system overload." Indeed, some recent investigations have found the inverse
relationship between the certainty of legal sanctions and crime rates is due more to the effect of
crime rates on the certainty of arrest and imprisonment than the effect of the certainty of arrest
and imprisonment on offense rates (Logan, 1975; Nagin, 1978). To consider this reciprocal relationship, I introduced the index crime rate for year t-1 (1959) as an additional control variable in
the analysis.2
4) When Jacobs considered only non-southern states (n = 35) he did not find a significant
positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for burglary. He attributes
this to the fact that in non-southern states, victim survey data do not show victims of burglary to
be at higher income levels. In contrast, in southern states, victims of burglary are at higher income levels. Accordingly, Jacobs argues that the relationship between income inequality and
2. The crime rate measure used is the total number of the following types of offenses per 100,000 popula-

tion: murder,assault,forciblerape, robbery,burglary,larceny,and auto theft. Note that I have used the

index crime rate lagged by one year (t-1) in examining the effect of crime on imprisonment ratios. Had I considered crime rates and imprisonment ratios in the same year, I would have encountered the as-yetunresolved methodological difficulty of separating the deterrent effect of the certainty of imprisonment on
offense rates from the effect of crime rates on imprisonment ratios (Greenberg et al., 1980; Logan, 1975;
Nagin, 1978).

burglary imprisonment ratios would differ for the two regions of the country. Jacobs' conclusion
may be correct, but the method he uses to test this question is inefficient, and possibly
misleading. To illustrate: He first examined 47 states and then repeated the analysis, excluding 12
southern jurisdictions. This control procedure does remove southern states, but it also results in
substantial loss of degrees of freedom (n = 35). As well, by excluding southern states from the
subsequent analysis, it remains unclear to what extent Jacobs' new findings are a result of: (1) a
different form of the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios in the two
regions of the country; and (2) examining different ranges in the inequality, imprisonment, and
control variables for southern and non-southern states. To address these questions more efficiently, Jacobs should have (1) computed a regional dummy variable in which non-southern and
southern states are differentiated by a 0/1 weighting; (2) multiplied the region and income inequality (Gini) values to form an interaction variable; and (3) introduced this computed variable
into the multivariate analysis to determine if there is a significant interaction between income inequality and region. This is the procedure I have used to extend Jacobs' analysis.
While part of my investigation is exploratory, I advance the following working hypotheses:
First, consistent with Jacobs' findings and the conflict model, I expect a significant positive relationship between income inequality (and non-white population) and certainty of imprisonment
for each index crime. Second, for the same reasons Jacobs suggests, I predict imprisonment ratios
to be (1) positively related to police per capita and mean income (a proxy variable for resources
available for crime control); and (2) negatively related to the proportion of state residents living
in large cities and percent change in population for the last 10-year period. Third, if the level of
crime does affect the ability of the criminal justice system to effectively deal with crime ("system
overload"), I expect a significant negative relationship between crime rates (for year t-1) and imprisonment ratios (for year t). Fourth, if there are differences between southern and nonsouthern states in patterns of victimization that influence the hypothesized relationship between
income inequality and imprisonment ratios, then the region-income inequality interaction
variable should provide a better predictor of imprisonment ratios than simply income inequality.
METHOD
To extend Jacobs' analysis, data were required for imprisonment ratios, income inequality, and
the control variables. As in Jacobs' study, I computed imprisonment ratios by dividing the
number of prison admissions for each crime by the number of crimes known to the police. Imprisonment and offense data were taken from figures issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and
Federal Bureau of Investigation, respectively.3
The income inequality measure used here is the conventional Gini coefficient which assesses income disparity/concentration in each state. Gini values for 1960 came from figures reported by
Janish and Kau (1973). Data for the control variables came from figures issued by the following
offices of the U.S. Department of Commerce: per capita income data from the Office of Business
Economics (1966), and data on state population living in places of 50,000 or more, percent
change in state population during the previous 10-yearperiod, percent non-white population, and
police per capita figures from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1961, 1964).4 Crime rate data for
3. Due to missing imprisonment data for 1960 for Alaska and Hawaii, these two states were excluded from
the analysis. Although not a state, the District of Columbia was included as an additional jurisdiction in the
analysis.
4. Whereas Jacobs used mean personal income data computed from Internal Revenue statistics as his income
measure, I use per capita income figures. Because both mean personal income and per capita income can be
considered to be reasonable proxy variables for the level of resources that states apply to crime control, I see
no a priori reason why either of these variables would be preferable. I chose the per capita income measure
solely because these data were readily available in Department of Commerce publications.

major felonies for year t-1 (1959) were taken from Federal Bureau of Investigation's (1959, 1960)
Uniform Crime Reports. A regional variable divided states into southern (value = 1) and nonsouthern (value = 0) jurisdictions.5 Finally, a region --income inequality interaction variable was
computed by multiplying the values for the Gini coefficient and the regional dummy variable.
The analysis proceeded through a series of multiple regressions. First, I examined Jacobs'
model of imprisonment for each index offense (Model I). Second, I repeated the analysis including the region-income inequality interaction variable (Model II).6 Third, I examined Jacobs'
model further by adding the index crime rate for year t-1 and non-white population as control
variables (Model III).
FINDINGS
the
Table 1 shows the results of
analysis for each of the three models. I expected a significant
income
inequality and imprisonment ratios but this is only partially
positive relationship between
The
beta
coefficients
are positive for burglary and larceny and auto theft,
borne out for Model I.
but only for burglary is the relationship statistically significant. For larceny, the largest beta is for
income inequality, but this coefficient is not significant at P < .05. In contrast, two variables are
better predictors of imprisonment for auto theft, with the coefficient being positive (as expected)
and statistically significant for the resource level variable.
Jacobs argues that, because the victims and offenders of violent crimes are more economically
similar than their counterparts for property crimes, the positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios for violent crimes should be weaker. Model I does not support
this prediction for murder and assault, nor for robbery which may also be considered a crime
against persons. On the contrary, for these three offenses there is an inverse relationship between
income inequality and imprisonment ratios. Although these negative coefficients are not
statistically significant, they do not provide support for the conflict model.
For Model II, where a region-income inequality variable is considered, the findings are again
mixed.7 For each property crime (including robbery), the interaction variable is positively
5. The following 17 jurisdictions are classified by the Bureau of Census as southern: Alabama, Arkansas,

Delaware,Districtof Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,Louisiana,Maryland,Mississippi,North

Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.
6. Strictly speaking, multiple regression requires that the independent variables entered into a regression
equation be orthogonal (independent). Seldom, if ever, however, is this assumption strictly met in actual
research applications, with multiple regression proving to be quite robust even when independent variables
are highly correlated (Farrar and Glauber,1967; Haitovsky, 1969). To determine if income inequality and
percent non-white population are too collinear (dependent) to be entered into the same regression equation, a
series of auxiliary regressions were performed. First, to remove the effect of race (non-white population)
from income inequality (Gini values), income inequality was regressed against non-white population and
residual Gini values were computed. This procedure made non-white population and income inequality independent (r = -.002) from one another. Second, the residual Gini values were substituted for the original
Gini values in the regressions for each offense. The assumption behind this procedure is that, if income inequality (apart from race) is a significant predictor of imprisonment ratios, then removing the effect of race
from inequality should not alter Jacobs' findings. Hence, as Jacobs interprets the conflict model, it is income
inequality and not race that affects imprisonment ratios. This procedure produced results consistent with the
findings reported in Tables 1 and 2 for both income inequality and non-white population and the other independent variables. Thus, I conclude that non-white population and income inequality are not too collinear
to be entered in the same equation.
7. For Model II (and Model III), where the possible interaction effect between region and income inequality
is considered, standardized coefficients are reported for (1) the interaction variable, (2) southern states, and
(3) non-southern states. Because the region variable differentiates non-southern and southern states by a 0/1
weighting respectively, a positive sign for the coefficients for the interaction variable indicates that there is a
more substantial relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios in southern jurisdictions.
Conversely, if the coefficients are negative for the interaction variable, the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment ratios is more substantial in non-southern states. For each region, the coefficients
indicate the direction and the magnitude of the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment
ratios.

TABLE 1

Multiple Regression Results for Three Models of
Imprisonment Ratios for Six Index Offenses, 1960
Independent Variables
MODELI
Economic Inequality(Gini)

Percent Residents of Large Cities
Percent Change in Population

Police Per Capita
Resource Level (Per Capita Income)
R2

MODELII
Economic Inequality & Region
Southern States

Non-Southern States
Percent Residents of Large Cities
Percent Change in Population

Police Per Capita
Resource Level (Per Capita Income)
R2
MODELIII
Economic Inequality & Region
Southern States
Non-SouthernStates

Percent Residents of Large Cities

Percent Change in Population
Police Per Capita
Resource Level (Per Capital Income)
Percent Non-White Population
Index Crime Rate, 1959

R2

Murder
-.180

-.249
-.104

-.176
.183
.147
-.115
-.194
-.079
-.248
-.010

Assault
-.123
-.432
-.145

.028
.111
.169

-.227
-.153

Robbery
- .023

-.428
-.158

.056
.092
.152
.310
.018

Burglary
.458a

-.516a
-.123

.194
-.247
.363b

.514a
.526

.500a
.451

-.292
-.430
-.171

.012
- .519a
-.142

-.164
-.045
.119

-.236
-.107
.129

.242
.145
- .097

.367
.339
- .028

.256
.101
.179

-.046
.126
.104

.215
.281
.102

.046
.074
.029

-.097

-.065
- .634a

.241

.053
.106
.183

-.391

.021
.098
.179

-.269

-.026
- .162

-.027
- .680a

.189

.284

.385

-.166
-.122

.177
-.030
.477c

.074
-.430
-.137

- .163
.181
.150

Larceny

.118
-.020
.552c

-.049
-.169
-.141

.138
-.237
.433c
.532a
.537
.005

- .461a

-.153

.289
-.300

-.096
-.050

.594c

-.119
.207
-.252
.436b

Auto
Theft
.217

-.267
-.010

-.214
.717a
.125
.003
.217

.214
-.267
-.010

- .215
.717a
.125

-.158
.107
.265
-.145

.326
-.139
.763a
.246
-.567

.216

Significance Levels: a = P< .05; b = P< .01; c = P< .001.

associated with imprisonment ratios, and the betas are statistically significant for burglary and
larceny. For burglary there is a moderate to strong relationship between income inequality and
imprisonment for southern states (.526), and only a slight association (.012) for non-southern
states. Similarly, for larceny there is a moderate relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for southern states (.451), and a slight negative association for non-southern jurisdictions (-.049). Comparison of the betas show that the region-income inequality variable is the
best predictor of imprisonment for larceny, and the second best predictor (behind the percentage
of residents living in large cities) for burglary.
For the remaining offenses there is no consistent pattern of regional effects upon the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment. For auto theft there is a slight positive relationship between income inequality and the dependent variable for both southern (.217) and nonsouthern states (.214), whereas for murder, income inequality and imprisonment ratios are
negatively associated for southern (- .194) and non-southern (- .079) jurisdictions. Finally, for
assault there is a slight negative relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for
southern states (and a slight positive relationship between these two factors in non-southern
states), but this pattern is reversed for robbery.
For Model III, where the index crime rate for 1959 and percent non-white population are introduced as control variables, the findings are also mixed, and even more unfavorable for the
conflict hypothesis. For larceny, there remains a significant interaction effect between region and
income inequality, with income inequality being a much better predictor of imprisonment in

southern (.537) than non-southern (.005) states. Unlike Model II, however, the index crime rate
for 1959 and percent non-white population reduced to insignificance the interaction effect between region and income inequality for burglary. As in Models I and II, only the percentage of
state residents living in large cities is a significant predictor of imprisonments for this offense.
As with Model II, the effect of region on the relationship between income inequality and imprisonment is mixed for the other offenses. For southern states, there is a slight positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for robbery and auto theft, but a slight
negative relationship between these two variables for murder and assault. In contrast, and with
the exception of robbery, there is a low positive relationship between income inequality and imprisonment for murder, assault, and auto theft for non-southern states.
Also at odds with the conflict argument is the fact that percent non-white population (race) is
not significantly related to imprisonment ratios for any of the six offenses. Moreover (and contrary to our hypothesis), non-white population and imprisonment ratios are negatively associated
for four offenses: murder, assault, robbery, and larceny.
Finally, Model III provides some support for the system overload hypothesis that the level of
crime affects the ability of the criminal justice system to effectively respond to crime. For each
offense, the higher the index crime rate (1959), the lower the imprisonment ratio (1960). For
murder (- .643) and robbery (- .680), these two factors are significantly related. The coefficient
for auto theft (-.567) is also substantial, but falls short of the .05 level of significance. For
murder and robbery, the index crime rate is the best predictor of imprisonment. For auto theft,
this factor ranks second behind the resource level variable. In contrast, there is only a slight
negative trade-off between the crime rate and imprisonment ratios for assault, burglary and
larceny.
Results For A Reduced Model
While the above results provide only limited support for the conflict hypothesis for income inequality and no support for the conflict hypothesis for race, the possibility exists that I have not
properly specified the imprisonment rate equations. Note that some variables were not
significantly related to imprisonment ratios for any offense for any model, while some other
variables were significant predictors of imprisonment for only some offenses. By retaining nonsignificant variables throughout the analysis (Models I, II, and III), degrees of freedom were
reduced, thus making it more difficult to establish a statistically significant finding for the
variables of primary interest, income inequality, and non-white population.
To test this question, imprisonment rates for each offense were regressed against income inequality (or the region-income inequality variable) and non-white population, and any other
variable examined in Model III that reached the .10 level of statistical significance. (A liberal .10
level of significance was chosen because of the ratio of the number of independent variables to
observations considered in Model III.) Accordingly, the predictor variables considered in the
reduced models differ by offense. Results of this analysis are shown in Table 2.8
Table 2 provides only limited support for the conflict argument. Percent non-white population
is not a significant predictor of imprisonment for any offense: the coefficients for race are mixed
in sign and low in magnitude. Similarly, for murder, robbery, auto theft, and assault, where income inequality is considered (rather than the interaction variable for region and income inequality), the betas are mixed in sign and low in magnitude. For murder, robbery, and auto theft,
the index crime rate is a significant predictor of imprisonment, along with the resource level
8. In Table2, the region-incomeinequalityinteractionvariableis consideredsolelyfor burglaryandlarceny,
sincethe resultsfor this variablewerenot statisticallysignificant(P < .10) in the earlieranalysis(ModelIII)
for the otheroffenses.

TABLE2

MultipleRegression Results for ReducedModelsof
ImprisonmentRatios for Six IndexOffenses, 1960
Independent Variables

Murder

Economic Inequality(Gini)
Percent Non-WhitePopulation
Economic Inequality & Region
Southern States
Non-SouthernStates
Percent Residents of Large Cities
Resource Level (Per Capita Income)
Index Crime Rate, 1959

R2

Assault

Robbery

-.149
-.115
***

.129
-.330
**

-.107
.079
**

***
***

***
**

*
**

***

- .486b

.201a

.066

- .370a

.216a

Burglary
***
.302
.374
.296
-.078
-.572c
**
***

.559c

Larceny
**
-.188
.522a
.766
.244
***
**
**

.369c

Auto
Theft
.132
.019

**
.516a

- .365a

.137

Significance Levels: a = P< .05; b = P< .01; c = P< .001.
*** Variables not included in the model for the offense indicated.

variable for auto theft. None of the independentvariablesare significantlyrelated to imprisonmentsfor assault.
For burglaryand larceny,wherethe region-incomeinequalityvariablewasexamined,the findingscloselyparallelthe earlierresults(ModelIII). Forlarceny,thereis a significantinteractioneffect betweenregionand incomeinequality,withincomeinequalitya betterpredictorof imprisonment for southern(.766) than non-southern(.244) states. This findingis consistentwith Jacobs'
earlystudy. In contrast,the reducedmodelfails to showa significantinteractioneffect at the .05
levelbetweenregionandincomeinequalityfor burglary.Note, however,that incomeinequalityis
positively associated with imprisonmentratios for southern states (.296), and negatively
associatedwith imprisonmentsfor non-southernstates(-.078).
To sumup, the aboveanalysis(Tables1 and2) revealsa generallystablepatternof findingsfor
the conflicthypothesis.First,for none of the six offensesis race(non-whitepopulation)a significant predictorof levelsof imprisonment.Second,withthe exceptionof larceny,incomeinequality is also not a significantpredictorof levelsof imprisonment.Evenfor larceny,however,there
is not a directrelationshipbetweenincomeinequalityand state imprisonmentratios. The relationshipdependsupon region, with incomeinequalityonly predictinglevelsof imprisonmentin
southernstates.This findingcontradictsJacobs'argumentthat incomeinequalityshouldhave a
relativelyuniformeffect on imprisonmentthroughoutthe statessincethe "affluentareevidently
the most frequentvictimsof larcenyin all regionsof the country"(1978:521).
SUMMARYAND CONCLUSION

This investigationextendsthe scope of Jacobs'(1978)study.Froma cross-sectionalanalysisof
statesfor 1960,Jacobsfinds that incomeinequalityis a significantdeterminantof imprisonment
ratiosfor burglaryand larceny,and concludesthat "conflicttheorydoes predictoutcomesin the
criminaljusticesystemwhenpropertyis at stake"(1978:523).Jacobscontendsthatthesefindings
challengeChirico'sand Waldo's(1975:769)assertionthat the availableevidenceconsistentlyfails
to supportthe expectationsof conflicttheoristswithregardto the sanctioningpowerof the state.
Jacobs'studysuffersfroma numberof limitations,however,andmy replicationandextensionof
his analysisdoes not supportthe conflicthypothesisfor eithercrimesagainstpersonsor property.
In summary,these are my findings:
1) Thereis a slight negativerelationshipbetweenincomeinequalityand imprisonmentratios
for murderand robbery,and a slight positiverelationshipbetweenincome inequalityand imprisonmentratiosfor assaultand auto theft. Fornone of theseoffensesarethe resultsstatistically

significant,nor is thereanyevidenceof a significantinteractioneffect betweenregionandincome
inequalityand imprisonmentratios for these offenses.
2) For burglaryand larceny,thereis a moresubstantialrelationshipbetweenincomeinequality
and imprisonmentratios, but this relationshipdependsupon region.For both offenses, income
inequalityis a betterpredictorof levelsof imprisonmentfor southernthan non-southernstates.
The interactioneffect betweenincomeinequalityandregionis statisticallysignificantfor larceny.
3) Non-whitepopulation(race)is negativelyassociatedwith imprisonmentratiosfor murder,
assault,and larceny,and positivelyassociatedwithlevelsof imprisonmentfor robbery,burglary,
and auto theft. Regardlessof theirsign, however,the coefficientsfor non-whitepopulationare
low in magnitudeand are not statisticallysignificant.
This analysisprovidesno supportfor the conflicthypothesis,withthe exceptionof the significant (P < .05) positiverelationshipbetweenincome inequalityand imprisonmentfor larceny.
Eventhis relationship,however,dependson region,withincomeinequalitybeinga betterpredictor of imprisonmentfor southern(beta = .766)thannon-southern(beta = .244)states.In other
words, it would appearthat the conflicthypothesisfor incomeinequalityonly holds for larceny
for southern states.9

I can provideno satisfactoryexplanationfor this finding,but offer two possiblehypotheses:
1) If "economicadvantageand poweronly predictimprisonmentratiosfor a crimeof whicha
numberof victimsareaffluent"(Jacobs,1978:522),thenmy contradictoryfinddisproportionate
for
for
ings larceny southernand non-southernstatesmaybe a resultof a differentpatternof victimizationof the affluentin the two regionsof the country.That is, the affluentmay be more
likelyvictimsof larcenyin southernstates.This hypothesisis not borneout by the victimization
data that Jacobs reports(1978:521).On the contrary,the proportionof people with incomes
above $10,000in 1966that werevictimsof larcenywas 18.3 percentin southernstatesand 19.2
percentin non-southernstates.Similarly,the proportionof peoplein the second-highestincome
category($6,000-9,999)that werevictimsof larcenywas 12.0percentin southernstatesand 16.0
percentin non-southernstates. While these percentagedifferencesare not large, if anything
Jacobs'argumentwouldlead us to expectincomeinequalityto be a betterpredictorof imprisonment for larcenyin non-southernjurisdictions.
2) There may be a non-linearrelationshipbetweenincome inequalityand imprisonmentfor
larceny,with this relationshipbeingqualitativelydifferentfor the two regions.Specifically,income inequalitymay haveto reacha certainlevel- a "tippingpoint"- beforeit has a significant
effect on imprisonmentratios, and this point may be reachedin southern,but not in nonsouthern,states.
To explorethis possibility,I examinedthe levelof incomeinequalityfor the two regionsof the
country. For non-southernstates, the Gini coefficientsrangefrom .312 to .391, with a mean
value of .346. For southernstates, the Gini coefficientsrangefrom .349 to .466, with a mean
valueof .410. TheseGinivaluesindicatethatnot only is the rangeof incomeinequalitygreaterin
southern(. 117)thannon-southern(.079) states,but thatthe absolutelevelof incomeinequalityis
greaterin southernstates.
This regionalpatternmay possibly account for the fact that income inequalityis a better
predictorof imprisonmentfor larcenyin southernstates. Supportfor this interpretationis provided by Jacobs' argumentthat "the more there are differencesin economic resourcesand
9. Note thatthesefindingsarenot uniqueto 1960.Rather,a replicationof the analysisfor 1964also showsa

significant (P < .01) positive relationship between income inequality and the imprisonment ratio for larceny,
with the association between these two variables being more substantial in southern (beta = .387) than nonsouthern (beta = .049) states. Also, as in 1960 income inequality is not a significant predictor of imprisonment ratios for the remaining index offenses for 1964. Nor is non-white population significantly related to
imprisonment for any offense. Results of the 1964 analysis are available from the author upon request.

economicpower,the more one can expectthat the criminalcodes will be administeredin a way
that pleasesmoniedelites,"and "one majorguaranteeof the supremacyof an economicelite is
property"(1978:516).If this interpretationis correct, however,one must ask why income inequality only significantlypredicts imprisonmentsfor larceny in southern states. Are not
burglary,auto theft, and robbery(and possiblyeven murderand assault)also threatsto the interestsof the moniedelite in southernstates?
My analysissuggeststhe answerto this questionis negative.For no crimeagainstproperty
other than larcenyis therea significantinteractioneffect betweenincomeinequalityand region
on imprisonmentratios.If anything,one wouldexpectsucha findingfor burglary,sincethose at
high incomelevels(above$10,000)are more likelyto be victimsof this offense in southern(8.5
percent)than non-southern(6.6 percent)states(Jacobs, 1978:521).This prediction,however,is
not borne out by the regressionanalysis.
Contraryto the conflict hypothesisand Jacobs'argument,and whereasthe more affluentin
the Southhavea highervictimizationrate for burglarythan theirnon-southerncounterparts,income inequalityis not a significantpredictorof imprisonmentfor burglaryin southernstates.
Conversely,whereasthe more affluent in the South have a lowervictimizationrate for larceny
than their non-southerncounterparts,income inequalityis a significantpredictorof imprisonment for larcenyin southernstates.Unfortunately,adequatedata arenot availablefor the period
under study to examineregionalpatternsof victimizationby income for the remainingcrimes
againstpropertyand personsconsideredin the analysis(Ennis, 1967).However,this is probably
not an importantconsiderationsince thereis no evidenceof a significantinteractioneffect between regionand incomeinequalityon imprisonmentratios for these offenses.
I can provideno adequateexplanationof why the relationshipbetweenincomeinequalityand
imprisonmentfor larcenyis conditionedby region,withinequalityonly beinga good predictorof
imprisonmentin the South. Whatis clear,however,is that this regionaldifferenceis not a result
of lowerratesof victimizationfor larcenyof the affluentin non-southernstates. Nor wouldthis
finding appearto be a resultof a generalsouthernresponseto propertycrimesand inequality,
since this regionalpatternis uniqueto larceny.
The evidencepresentedin this analysisfor both race and incomeinequalityoverwhelmingly
refutes Jacobs' argumentthat "conflicttheory does predictoutcomes in the criminaljustice
systemwhenpropertyis at stake."I agreewithJacobs,however,that "itwouldbe naiveto expect
that the evidencefrom any singleresearchdesigncan settlethe disputebetweenconflictand consensustheorists"(1978:523).Thisis certainlytrueof his study,and is no lessthe casewithmine.I
must, however,take strongissuewith Jacobs'claimthat his researchsuccessfullychallenges- at
least for propertycrimes- critics of the conflict hypothesis. Rather, the supportthat Jacobs
reports for the conflict hypothesiswould appearto be a consequenceof the theoreticaland
methodologicalshortcomingsof his analysis.
andGordonP. Waldo
Chiricos,Theodore
1975
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